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Introduction
Several empirical studies emphasize the importance of news shocks for business cycle fluctuations. These shocks materialize in the future, but their size and maturity time is anticipated in advance by the agents. Most prominently, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) find in an estimated real business cycle model that about 50 percent of economic fluctuations can be attributed to anticipated disturbances.
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A theoretical branch of the literature indicates that news shocks destabilize the economy, i.e. lead to a higher volatility than unanticipated shocks of the same form. Fève et al. (2009) demonstrate in a purely forward-looking rational expectations model that news shocks increase the volatility with increasing length of anticipation. With both backward-and forward-looking expectations, the volatility results are ambiguous as it is shown by Winkler and Wohltmann (2012) in an univariate model. However, they find that the anticipation of cost shocks -as considered here -greatly amplifies the volatility of all key macroeconomic variables in the estimated model of Smets and Wouters (2003) . These (empirical and theoretical) findings rely on the assumption of forward-looking rational expectations. By contrast, under purely backward-looking expectations, the volatility is independent of the anticipation horizon.
3 Backward-looking expectations can be introduced via price indexation, rule-of-thumb behavior or bounded rationality.
4
So far, optimal monetary policy has been studied almost exclusively in the presence of unanticipated disturbances. 5 One exception is the study of Winkler and Wohltmann (2011) , who analyze optimal simple interest rules. They find that the inclusion of forward-looking 1 Note that we limit our discussion to cost-push shocks for which the central bank faces a trade off between output and inflation stabilization even without instrument target as considered here. This type of shock is also found to be highly relevant for business cycle fluctuations, see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012). 2 Further related to this branch of literature is the paper by Offick and Wohltmann (2013) , who study the properties of the lag polynomial associated with news shocks. 3 To see this, consider the model y t = ρy t−1 +ε t−q , where ε t−q ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is an i.i.d. news shock that is anticipated q periods in advance. Assuming stationarity, the variance of this model is given by V ar(y t ) = σ 2 /(1 − ρ 2 ), i.e. independent of q. 4 Bounded rationality assumes that agents have cognitive limitations and use simple heuristics (rule of thumbs) to guide their behavior and are recently under growing investigation, see e.g. De Grauwe (2012) and Lengnick and Wohltmann (2016) . 5 This includes Leitemo (2008) , who finds an inverse relation between the private pricing behavior and the optimal monetary strategy. If the private sector is backward-looking, monetary policy should be forward-looking, and vice versa. This general result also holds for news shocks.
elements in an instrument rule is welfare enhancing in the case of anticipated shocks.
6 However, they focus on purely forward-looking private expectations and the resulting welfare effects. By contrast, we study the relation between news shocks, volatility, optimal monetary policy, and hybrid price setting.
In light of these findings, our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways: First, we combine the theory of news shocks and optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian framework. Second, we study the (de)stabilizing effects of anticipated cost shocks in a multivariate
environment. Third, we analyze how the relative volatility results of news shocks change with increasing degree of backward-looking price setting behavior. We provide analytical results for the limit case of purely forward-and purely backward-looking price setting behavior.
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2 News shocks and optimal monetary policy
We assume that the inflation rate is governed by a standard hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form
where π t and x t are the inflation rate and the output gap measured as percentage deviations from the steady state, respectively. φ π measures the degree to which the price setting behavior is backward-looking. For φ π = 0 (φ π = 1), the price-setting behavior is purely forwardlooking (backward-looking). 8 ε t−q is a white noise cost-push shock with unit variance which is anticipated q periods in advance. The shock is unanticipated for q = 0.
For convenience, we assume first that the central bank aims to minimize the weighted sum 6 Further noteworthy is the paper by Winkler and Wohltmann (2009) , who show how to solve rational expectations models with news shock under optimal unrestricted monetary policy. 7 Details on the derivation of our results can be found in the Appendix. 8 This general form is taken from Leitemo (2008) . In Section 3, we consider a microfounded hybrid Phillips curve with partial price indexation, which does however not nest a purely backward-looking Phillips curve as special case.
of variance of the inflation rate and the output gap:
We compute the optimal unrestricted monetary policy response under (timeless) commitment and the discretionary policy. 10 The optimal targeting rule under commitment, in which the central bank is able to commit to future policies, includes forward-and backward-looking elements:
Note that in both limit cases (φ π = 0 and φ π = 1) the system remains hybrid. This is due to the inverse relation between the price-setting behavior and the optimal monetary strategy.
Contrarily, the optimal discretionary policy is independent of backward-looking elements:
The undetermined coefficient ρ π follows from the reduced form of inflation. ρ π is independent from the anticipation horizon q and solves the following polynomial equation of order five:
Note that under purely forward-looking price setting (φ π = 0), we obtain ρ π = 0 and the discretionary policy is not forward-looking, but given by π t = −(λ/κ)x t . Under purely backwardlooking price setting (φ π = 1), the discretionary policy is equivalent to the commitment policy.
Both targeting rules (3) and (4) are independent of the lead time q and, therefore, equivalent to the optimizations in Leitemo (2008) . Equations (1) and (3) fully describe the dynamics of the output gap and the inflation rate under commitment. Equations (1) and (4) fully describe the dynamics under discretionary policy.
Before we turn to the general case of hybrid private price-setting behavior, we discuss the limit case of purely forward-looking price setting.
Purely forward-looking price setters
We first discuss the volatility results in the regime commitment. For φ π = 0, the system can be reduced to an univariate hybrid equation of the form
with a = βb, b = λ/(λ(1 + β) + κ 2 ), and c = −κ/(λ(1 + β) + κ 2 ). Since 1 > β > 0, sgn(a) = sgn(b). This implies that the variance of x t is unambiguously increasing in q as it is
shown by Winkler and Wohltmann (2012) .
The volatility of the inflation rate, on the other hand, may also be decreasing in q. Its variance is given by
where |α| < 1 is the stable root of α 1,2 = 1 ± √ 1 − 4ab /(2a), β 0 = c/(1 − aα), and δ = a/(1 − aα). 11 An unanticipated shock may generate a higher inflation volatility than a costpush shock that is anticipated in the infinite past:
The reason for the ambiguity in the inflation volatility are two opposing effects: On the one hand, the longer the length of anticipation, the higher is the variance of the output gap, which -in isolation -also leads to a higher variance in inflation. On the other hand, the response of the output gap becomes smoother, i.e. x t is more autocorrelated, with increasing q. Since the inflation rate depends via the targeting rule on the change in the output gap, this reduces -in isolation -the variance of inflation. 12 Condition (8) does not imply that an anticipated cost shock gives a lower inflation volatility for all anticipation horizons. That is, the inflation variance may not be monotonic in q. For small values of q, V ar(π t ) may be increasing and the maximum is reached in q = max(q * , 0) where
Despite the fact that the variance of inflation may be decreasing in q, the total loss (2) is always increasing in q. Only under strict inflation targeting (λ = 0) does the central bank perfectly stabilize the inflation rate and the loss is zero, independently of q.
Note that under purely forward-looking price setting behavior, the welfare theoretic loss is of the same form as the assumed loss (2) with λ = κ/χ, where χ denotes the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. The inequality (8) then reads κχ > √ 1 + 4β−(1+β).
11 Note that the output gap can be written as an ARMA(1,q) process of the form x t = αx t−1 + q k=0 δ k β 0 ε t+k−q . A stable solution requires |α| < 1. 12 The two opposing effects can be directly seen by taking the variance of the targeting rule:
, where both V ar(x t ) and E(x t x t−1 ) are increasing in q. In the regime discretion, the volatility of the output gap and the inflation rate is unambiguously increasing in q under purely forward-looking price setting. For φ π = 0, the model under discretion is purely forward-looking. This implies that the volatility of inflation and output gap is increasing in q as it is shown by Fève et al. (2009) . These results are illustrated in figure 1.
Hybrid price-setting behavior
If we allow for backward-looking price-setting behavior (i.e. φ π > 0), the results under purely forward-looking price setting of the previous subsection may be reversed. We start with the regime commitment. For this regime, figure 2 shows the differences in the volatilities and the central bank's loss between an anticipated and an unanticipated cost shock for different degrees of hybridity and anticipation horizons. If φ π -the degree of backward-lookingness -is sufficiently large, an anticipated cost shock leads simultaneously to a lower volatility in output and inflation and to a lower loss than an unanticipated shock of the same size. The reason for this inversion of volatility results (compared to φ π = 0) is the inverse relation between the If the degree of backward-looking price setting behavior is sufficiently large (small), anticipated cost-push shocks lead to a lower (higher) volatility in the output gap and in the central bank's loss than a unanticipated shocks of the same size.
The left plot of figure 3 also shows that the volatility in inflation may decrease in q for a much larger range of hybridity φ π (even for φ π = 0) than the volatility of output. However, the exact range depends on the weight λ: If λ is sufficiently small (in figure 3: λ < 0.15 suffices), the volatility in the inflation rate is increasing in q for sufficiently strong backward-looking price setting behavior.
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The volatility results under discretion are summarized in the right plot of figure 3. If the price setting is sufficiently backward-looking, discretion generates similar results to commitment. In the limit case φ π = 1, the two regimes are equivalent. Contrarily to commitment, the inflation volatility is only decreasing in q for sufficiently high degrees of backward-lookingness (in figure 3: φ π ≥ 0.4).
Microfounded loss and Phillips curve
Until now, we have assumed a given central bank's loss which coefficients are not a function of structural parameters and a Phillips curve where the inflation expectations are a weighted average of forward-looking and backward-looking expectations. In this section, we check whether our above results also hold under (i) a central bank's loss that is a second order approximation of the household's welfare function and (ii) a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve that follows from partial price indexation. Let γ be the degree of price indexation, then the inflation dynamics are described by
with ω 1 = β/(1 + βγ), ω 2 = γ/(1 + βγ), and ω 3 = κ/(1 + βγ).
14 Following Woodford (2003), the welfare theoretic loss function based on (A.21) is given by
where λ = κ/((1 + βγ)χ). χ denotes the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.
Assuming separable preferences and neglecting capital, κ = (σ + η)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)/θ where θ is the Calvo parameter, σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Contrarily to the proposed loss (2), the loss function Parameter calibration:
monetary policy rule under commitment is given by
For γ = 0, the equations (A.21) to (12) collapse to the standard purely forward-looking case and are equivalent to our originally proposed model for φ π = 0. However, the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve (A.21) does not nest a purely backward-looking Phillips curve as special case in contrast to the originally proposed Phillips curve (1). In fact, the limit case of full price indexation (γ = 1) leads to a hybrid Phillips curve in which expected future and past inflation equally affect current inflation. This limit case roughly corresponds to φ π = 0.5.
As a result, anticipated cost-push shocks in the model with price indexation generate a higher output volatility and central bank's loss than unanticipated shocks. 16 This is illustrated in figure 4 which shows the volatility and loss difference in the regime commitment. 
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the volatility implications of anticipated cost-push shocks in a hybrid New
Keynesian model with forward-and backward-looking price setting behavior both under optimal unrestricted monetary and discretionary policy. In both regimes, we find that an anticipated cost-push shock lead to a larger (smaller) volatility in the output gap and to a larger (smaller) central bank loss than an unanticipated shock of the same size if the degree of backward-looking price setting behavior is sufficiently small (large). By contrast, if the central bank follows an ad hoc or optimized contemporaneous Taylor-type rule and the price setters are purely (forward-) backward-looking, the volatility of the economy is (increasing with) independent of the anticipation horizon. In this section, we derive the targeting rules under optimal unrestricted monetary policy (commitment) and under optimal discretionary policy using the New Keynesian Phillips curve
and the central bank loss
A.1.1 Commitment
The central bank minimizes the loss function (A.2) subject to the Phillips curve (A.1). The Lagrange function to this problem is given by
with the first-order conditions for t > t 0 (timeless perspective solutions)
18 Note that, strictly speaking, the central bank loss (A.2) is equivalent to lim β→1 (1 − β) Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) . The constant (1 − β) however does not affect the first-order conditions and we set the discount factor close to unity, i.e. β = 0.99.
The optimal monetary response of the central bank can be summarized by the following targeting rule:
A.1.2 Discretion
Under discretionary policy, the central bank is not able to commit to future policies. It can, therefore, not directly affect private expectations, but only indirectly through the persistence of the inflation rate given by the hybrid structure of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. To account for this, we replace the expected future inflation rate in the central bank's optimization using the reduced-form solution of the inflation rate and the output gap. The guessed reduced-form solutions are given by
with the undetermined coefficients ρ π , ρ 0 , . . . , ρ q and η π , η 0 , . . . , η q . The reduced-form solutions imply
Replacing E t π t+1 in the Phillips curve (A.1) gives .11) 19 Since the targeting rule is independent of q, it is equivalent to the one derived in Leitemo (2008) .
The Lagrange function to the discretionary optimization problem is then given by A.12) with the first-order conditions
Thus, the optimal discretionary monetary response reads
which is independent of the anticipation horizon q (holds ∀q ≥ 0).
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To determine the unknown coefficient ρ π , we replace x t , π t , E t π t+1 , and E t x t+1 in the Philips curve (A.1) and targeting rule (A.15):
For {ρ π , ρ 0 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , η π , η 0 , η 1 , η 2 } to be solutions, equations (A.16) and (A.17) should hold for any 20 The targeting rule (A.15) is equivalent to the one derived in Leitemo (2008) for q = 0.
{π t , ε t }. Thus, the unknown coefficient ρ π is determined by the system
Solving (A.19) for ρ π and substituting into (A.18), ρ π is the stable solution of the following polynomial equation of order five: .20) Note that the limit case φ π = 0 implies ρ π = 0 so that the targeting rule (A.15) collapses to π t = −(λ/κ)x t . In the limit case φ π = 1, the targeting rules under optimal unrestricted monetary and discretionary policy are equivalent.
A.2 Microfounded central bank loss and Phillips curve
In this section, we derive the targeting rules under optimal unrestricted monetary policy (commitment) and under optimal discretionary policy using the microfounded hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve that follows from partial price indexation:
with ω 1 = β/(1 + βγ), ω 2 = γ/(1 + βγ), and ω 3 = κ/(1 + βγ). given by
where χ is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. κ can be presented as a function of structural parameters. Assuming separable preferences and neglecting capital,
where θ is the Calvo parameter, σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Lagrange function to this problem is given by
with the first-order conditions
22 χ can bet set to 8 implying a steady state price mark-up on the goods market of approximately 14 percent. Setting σ = η = 2, β = 0.99 and θ = 0.75 gives κ = 0.34.
A.2.2 Discretion
To derive the discretionary policy, we again use the following reduced-form solutions:
Replacing E t π t+1 in the Phillips curve (A.21) gives
where
The Lagrange function to the discretionary optimization problem is then given by .34) with the first-order conditions
which is independent of the anticipation horizon q.
To determine the unknown coefficient ρ π , we replace x t , π t , E t π t+1 , and E t x t+1 in the Philips curve (A.21) and targeting rule (A.38): .40) where ψ 1,j and ψ 2,j are constants which are not relevant for the determination of ρ π and η π . ρ π and η π follow from the solution of
The two equations can be reduced to a single equation of order five:
−βλ ω ∼ N(0, σ 2 ) can be written as MA(∞) of the form
where α = 1 − √ 1 − 4ab /(2a), β 0 = c/(1 − aα), and δ = a/(1 − aα). The variance of y t can be derived as follows:
v t and w t can be simplified to
In summary, the variance of y t is given by V ar(y t ) = V (q) where
Note that V (q) can also be written as
(B.14)
B.2 Purely forward-looking price setting
In this section, we discuss the variance of the output gap, the inflation rate and the central bank's loss in the limit case of purely forward-looking price setting behavior. In this limit case (φ π = 0), the New Keynesian model under optimal unrestricted monetary policy given by (A.1) and (A.6) reduces to
The output gap x t can be written as hybrid univariate model equation of the form (B.1) with
Hence, the variance of x t is given by V ar(x t ) = V (q), where
Since dV ar q (h t )/dq > 0 and dCov q (x t−1 , h t )/dq > 0, it holds dV ar q (x t )/dq > 0.
The variance of the inflation rate can be deduced from the targeting rule (B.16):
To derive the condition for V ar q=0 (π t ) > V ar q→∞ (π t ), note that
Using the definitions (B.17) to (B.19), V ar q=0 (π t )
Let z = κ 2 /λ, then inequality B.33 can be simplified to
and holds if
Although the variance of the inflation rate may decrease with increasing anticipation horizon q, it can be shown that the loss
is always smaller for q = 0 than for q → ∞. It holds:
This inequality is always satisfied since z = κ 2 /λ > 0.
B.3 Purely backward-looking price setting
In this section, we discuss volatility results in the opposite limit case of purely backward-looking price setting behavior. In this limit case (φ π = 1), the New Keynesian model under optimal unrestricted monetary policy given by (A.1) and (A.6) reduces to 23 π t = βπ t−1 + κx t + ε t−q (B.41)
The inflation rate can be written as a hybrid univariate equation of the form π t = aE t π t+1 + bπ t−1 + c(ε t−q − β 2 E t ε t−q+1 ) (B.43) with c = ϕ/(1 + ϕ + ϕβ 3 ), b = βc, a = β 2 c, and ϕ = λ/(κ 2 ). The system can again be written as π t = t+1 ,x t+1 ,π t+1 , E t x t+1 , E t π t+1 ) ′ ,η Q and Z are the complex-conjugates of Q and Z, respectively. The (q + 3 × q + 3)-dimensional submatrices S 11 and T 11 contain the stable eigenvalues of the system (C.1).
24 Note that S −1 11 and Z −1 11 exist if the conditions of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) hold.
